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1. A Community decision is required as to whether and on what basis to take 
part in the UNCTAD conference to negotiate a new International Sugar 
Agreement which has been scheduled for 18 April to 27 May 1977. 
§!S.ls9!2YOQ 
2. The Community is not a member of the·~xisting Agreement but has partici-
pated with observer status in meetings directed towards the preparation 
of a new agreement. 
3. On 18 June 1976 it made a formal statement to the International Sugar 
Council. In this, the Community declared itself in favour of the princi-
ple of participation in a new Agreement, but against the approach to 
such an agreement contained in the draft then under consideration. It 
agreed conditionally to take part in further preparatory work, but remained 
otherwise uncommitted. 
4. Since that date the Community has taken an active part in the preparatory 
work which has preceded the establishment of the draft negotiating text. 
It has explained in detail, both orally and in writing, its proposals for 
a system in which market stabilisation would be sought through a maximum 
and minimum price structure supported by the internationally-coordinated 
management of national stock levels coupled with appropriate disciplines 
in extreme price situations. In this approach, which is founded on the 
GATT MTN negotiating directive, the Community finds itself totally isola-
ted; and it is clear beyond doubt that there is no possibility of the 
negotiating conference being led to adopt it. 
5. The negotiating document which will be before the Conference is a draft 
prepared by the International Sugar Organisation Secretariat, which is 
discussed in more detail in paras 15 to 18 below. 
6. In these circumstances the Community must now decide whether to take part 
in the negotiations at all and, if so, by what means to safeguard its in-
terests. 
• I • 
7. The constraints within which the Community must take its decisions 
are analysed below. 
2. 
8. The common organisation of the Community's sugar market dates from 
1968. In its present form it applies until 1980, when it will be re-
viewed • It is a complex structure arrived at only with difficulty, 
and it would be correspondingly difficult for the Community to mo-
dify it in any basic respect. 
9. Its essential feature is a quota system in two parts 
fixed basic quotas CA quotas) and an additional variable element 
(8 quotas). The total of basic quotas was not related to total 
internal consumption but was fixed with reference to the:- actual p_roduc-
~ion' in _a __ previous refer~nce period~ T-he aim of the additional 8 quot-a~; 
.. -- -
was_ to a~_~o.~o~ _ _further production to take place in areas best suited to beet 
growing • __ The"8" quotas_ are f_i~ed annu~lly_ by the Council as a proportion of 
_-''A" ql.!_otas. The resul_t __ of the_ application of this __ system was and rema-ins a-· 
total_ Community quota-based Produ_cti.on whi~;h i~_no_r!YJa.~~>' in excess of to-. 
·-
tal internal requirements. 
10. In addition, producers have the right to produce sugar (C sugar) 
in excess of their A and 8 quotas. All C sugar must be exported by 
the producers concerned without Community financial assistance, wi-
thout quantitative restriction and entirely at their own financial 
risk .• 
11. The net effect is that export outlets must be sought each year for 
surplus quota sugar and all C sugar. 
.I • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
3 • 
12. The Community's obligations under Protocol 3 of the Lome Convention, 
and parallel arrangements with certain other developing c0untries not 
party to that Convention, __ may_b~_~ummarised as follows.! ..... 
13. Under these arrangements the countries concerned undertake to supply, 
and the Community guarantees the purchase and import of sugar totalling 
some 1.4 million tons (raw equivalent) annually, at guaranteed prices 
linked to the Community's internal prices. There is no terminal date to 
the Community's obligation; and the quantity can be reduced only to the 
extent that the supplying countries concerned fail to meet their supply 
commitment for reasons other than force majeure. In a situation where the 
world price is below the guaranteed price the suppliers have every incen-
tive to make sure that this does not happen. 
14. These arrangements constitute a very important economic lifeline to the 
countries concerned at no small cost to the Community. 
15. The draft text prepared by the International Sugar Organisation for the 
forthcoming negotiations is based directly on the 1968 Agreement. 
16. Essentially, it consists of an export quota mechanism to stabilize the 
price of sugar by regulating the level of supplies coming on to the free 
market. The system is complicated. A basic export tonnage is negotiated 
in the agreement for each exporter member as a share of the notional to-
tal market. Just before the beginning of each quota year the likely size 
of effective market demand is estimated, and.a corresponding proportionate 
share of that estimate is allocated to each member as his initial export 
quota for the year. 
.1. 
4. 
These quotas may be adjusted up or down during the course of the year 
in function of specified movements of the actual market price towards 
the maximum and minimum prices fixed in the agreement. 
17. Altogether, this is an exceedingly dirigiste system quite incompatible 
w1th the existing structure of the Community market. 
18. In addition to the quota mechanism , the draft negotiating document con-
tains provisions dealing with purchase commitments, respect of minimum 
price,, apd non-purchas~ from non-members when the market is weak, coupled 
m1n1mum stocks and 
with/supply obligations related to a maximum price situation. In contrast 
to the quota mechanism just described, these provisions present no special 
problems to the Community, since they are broadly in line with the general 
principles of the Community's own approach. 
19. All the exporters insist on export quotas as the fundamental mechanism 
for stabilising the free market price of sugar. They seek an agreement 
which will safeguard their interests when the market is weak; and they 
see the variable quota mechanism as the only means of guaranteeing them 
a pre-determined share of the market and of. p-ermitting· them--to- programme· 
their production accordingly. 
20. None of the exporters will accept a stock mechanism alone - of whatever 
size or system. They have four main objections : the capital and recurrent 
costs of carrying the stock; the tendency of a stock to overhang the mar-
ket and depress the price at all times; the need for a back-up system to 
protect the price from still further erosion after all stock obligations 
had been met; the possibility open to wealthy developed countries to meet 
their stock obligations by a corresponding expansion of production, 
thus remaining free to export without restraint yet without being in 
breach of the agreement. Of these objections, the last two are the most 
entrenched. 
21. Within these parameters there are certain variations of approach. 
A number of countries have indicated a willingness to contemplate a more 
important role for stocks; in the case of developing countries this has 
been accompanied by the condition that they should not be required to bear 
.1. 
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5. 
any corresponding additional financial burden • 
A number of developing countries are tending to insist on indexation 
of the negotiated prices to counter inflation and currenc:· fluctuations 
during the life of the agreement; and to demand that any g~owth in the 
market should be reserved for the growth of their export quotas. Expor-
ters (such as Australia and Brazil) with potential for rapid expansion 
of production show a greater flexibility of approach to the fixing and 
adjustment of quotas than countries (like Cuba) which face production 
difficulties. The same countries have a conflict of interest on whether 
special arrangement sugar transactions should be excluded from the scope 
of the new agreement Cas they were in the past). 
22. Mauritius' original proposal for an international intervention stock 
backed-up by export quotas coming into force only at the minimum price 
has been withdrawn in the face of solid opposition from all the other 
exporters. Mauritius now accepts the basic Lines of the draft negotiating 
text, but has introduced a proposal for the financing of stocks resulting 
directly from quota reductions : the interest and handling charges on 
sugar thus stocked would be met from the proceeds of a levy on all im-
ports and exports of free market sugar. This proposal has been met with 
cautious reserve. 
23a The importers'group is dominated by Canada and Japan. Both have stated 
their ·willingness to accept the exporters' view that the fundamental 
mechanism of the agreement must be an export quota system. Both have 
_-_-insisted on ·the -need. for t_he.qu_ota adjustment mechanism to be much more 
realistic and flexible than~1~_th~ past, so as to encourage a shift of'trad~ 
to efficient- produ:c-er_s ___ inste_ii~ __ or sfmply rree'zin~g _t~e traditional pattern. 
Both have rejected the idea of making any financial contribution towards 
the cost of stocks, and assert the view that their acceptance of price 
maintenance through export quotas already constitutes a sufficient contri·· 
but ion. 
In consequence, the Community's proposals have obtained no suppcrt in 
this quarter, despite the attraction that stocks ought to present ~o 
imprJr.ters as a supoly assurance in times of production _:;l-Jortage. 
24. The USSR has taken little part in the discussions to date except to make 
it clear that ·--;-r1s1nteres·te"d-onty·-;r,-- a--quota-based agreement c f the 
-1968-t'ype-;-wffh-sp-ecTaT-status for the u.s.s.R. under t:1e 1968 r-qreement 
./. 
6. 
t~~ u.s.s.R.'! wub•ta"t1tL 1mport• from Cub~ auaL1f1td 1t •• an im~or• 
ting :ner,•ber, ~Jith a correspondingly substantial vote under the adminis-
trative arrang~ments of the Agreement. The U.S.S.R. concurrently obtained 
t~e right to export between 1.1 and 1.25 million tons each year to the 
free market in ~99i!iQD to any sugar exported by the U.S.S.R. to other 
Eastern Bloc countries; and at· the same time all exports by Cuba to all 
Eastern Bloc countries were treated as special arrangements, and there-
fore additional to the Cuban export quota on to the free market. 
25. The position of the USA, which is by far the biggest importer of all, 
remains totally undefined until the Carter administration has time to ad-
dre$ itself to the problem of how best to protect American interests. 
- §~l2Df~_gf_iD!~!~§!_Q~!~~~D-~~~Q!!~£§_2Qg_jm~Q!!~!§ 
26. Canada and Japan have said they cannot operate, and therefore cannot 
accept, obligations to respect the minimum price; in their view it is 
for the exporters to take care of this. Equally, they will not accept 
quantitative purchase obligations. They repeat that the quota system 
itself provides the exporters with all the guarantees they need at the 
minimum price, and that importer acceptance of this system must be 
paid for by supply commitments at the maximum price. 
27. The exporters have made it equally clear that they will not enter into 
supply commitments (either of price or quantity) at the maximum price 
except in return for symmetrical commitments by the importers at the 
minimum price. 
28. It is therefore conceivable that agreement, if reached, would only be 
on the basis of deleting both purchase and supply commitments. 
29. The economic factors may be summed up in the following terms. 
30. Domestic production meets the whole of the internal demand plus an 
exportable surplus which, depending on weather conditions, may reach 
the order of 1.6 million tons. Lome Convention imports amount to 1.4 
million tons. The Community therefore currently needs the assurance 
of export outlets for some 3 million tons per annum if the accumulation 
of unwanted stocks is to be avoided. 
.1. 
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7. 
31. The Community's exports normally take the form of white sugar, refined 
from beet and from cane. 
The external market for white sugar forms part of the AOrld free market 
to which the new agreement would apply. It is never:he~~JJ a separate 
component of the market with its own specifiG Limitations. World demand 
for white sugar is normally of the order of 3.5 miLLion tons. 
32. The size of the total free.market to be regulated is of the order of 14 
million tons. (1975 ISO figure) This includes USA imports of some 4 mil-
lion tons, and amounts committed under Long-term contracts for destina-
tions other than USA of another 5 million tons, leaving only some 5 mil-
Lion tons as the true free market. 
33. On the entry into force of a new agreement with export quota provisions, 
quotas would apply at once. To obtain a quota corresponding to the 
Community's export needs, as analysed in paragraph 30 above, this would 
be subject to immensely difficult negotiation. (It may be noted that in 
the negotiations leading to the 1968 Agreement the Community of the Six 
sought an export quota.of 1 million tons and was offered a quota of 
300 000 tons only). To join an agreement on these terms would give the 
Community the undisputed right to its negotiated share of the market, 
but would at the same time mean that under normal beet harvest conditions 
a very substantial tonnage would become unexportable. 
34. If the Community remained outside the agreement it would not be subject 
to this Limitation, but neither would it have the corresponding entitle-
ment. The export possibilities open to the Community under these condi-
tions would depend on the extent to which members observed their own 
rules about respect of the minimum price.and abstention from purchase 
from non-members, and on the extent of membership. Neither of these 
factors could be quantified beforehand. 
35. Whether the Community would be better off (a) inside the agreement with 
the right to export a specific limited quantity of sugar, or (b) outside 
the agreement with the freedom to sell all the sugar for which it ~ould 
find a market, is a question of judgment. In forming s~ch a judgment 
account would have to be taken both of the likehood th~t the Community 
would come under considerable moral pressure not to under~ut the market 
which developing exporters were trying to stabilise through 
mut;..,.: ~el.F- ::scipline, and of the difficulties for the Community 
of modi ,·ying -:he amount of domestic sugar produced under its exis-
ting system. ~inally, account would have to be taken of the likely 
cost to Community funds of export restitutions on sugar eligible for 
Community guarantees Cie. all except the C sugar element). This cost 
would be variable in function of the difference between the world 
price and the Community price, and of the quantity exported; while 
the world market price remains volatile this cost is correspondingly 
difficult to estimate in advance with any degree of precision. 
8. 
36. The Community's sugar market organisation represents a complex and dif-
ficult internal balance, both political and economic. This balance results 
in the need to be able to export sugar on to the world market, and it is 
essential to the Community to safeguard its interests in this respect. 
37. In recent years the Community has stated on many occasions and in many 
fora its commitment to the principle of trade expansion and market stabi-
lisation through international commodity agreements. It cannot back down 
from this commitment now, and in its negotiating stance it must be seen 
to be adopting a positive and credible position which takes due account of 
the consensus of views of its negotiating partners in general, of the 
developing countries in particular, and.of .the general context of the 
UNCTAD integrated programme· approach. · 
38. Unfortunately, with its potentiality as a major net exporter, the Communi-
ty is seen by the exporting members, particularly the developing exporters, 
as a direct competitor. Their desire for Community membership of the agree-
ment stems directly from their desire to limit Community competition to a 
tolerable level, and they are unlikely to accept any solution which does 
not offer the prospect of this result. 
39. In the light of this analysis the Community should negotiate on the 
basis of obtaining a special status in the agreement, adapted to the 
Community's own market stabilisation mechanisms and leaving the other 
members of the agreement free to adopt the system they prefer. Since 
special status is accepted for the USSR there can be no objection of 
principle to this. 
• 
., 
• 
-
9. 
4~ The Community's status should be that of exporter, with exclusion of 
the Community's preferential sugar imports from the net export calcu-
lation on which votes in the agreement would be based. This would 
be a mirror image of the USSR special status as impor~er ~ith inclusion 
of her special arrangement imports from Cuba fc.- the purposes of vote 
entitlement calculations. 
41. The Community would accept no export quota obligations. It would, ho-
wever, be prepared to negotiate a commitment to contribute to the sta-
bilisation of the world sugar market, through mechanisms compatible 
with its own market organisation, parallel to the commitments accep-
ted by other exporters. The mechanisms envisaged for this purpose would 
be broad~y of the type described (mutatis mutandis) in paraqraphs 13 to 15 
of the GATT neaotiatina directive_(doc. I/40/1/75 (CoS .4) rev.1 of 24 April 75). 
42. As indicated in para 18 above, the other economic elements of the draft 
negotiating document (on minimum stocks, supply and purchase commitments, 
respect of minimum price, provisions against purchases from non-members) 
present no particular problem, in the sense that they are not out of Line 
with the Community's existing GATT negotiating directive. 
43. The Community's proposal is one which can be justified as capable of pro-
ducing the required result without imposing unacceptable modifications 
on the Community's market organisation. It would represent a considerable 
step by the Community towards a compromise solution. At this juncture 
the Community should not be willing to pay too great a price to achieve 
a settlement which may be beyond reach for other reasons. 
44. It is to be noted that arrangements would need to be made to enable the 
Community as such to participate in the negotiating conference. 
45. The Co~munity's existing negotiating directivz is dir2ct~d specificul ly 
to the conduct of the GATT multilateral negotiations. The rnembers ot the 
International Sugar Agreement having decided tc r.egot~at~ ~r. an UNCTAD 
context, a formal adaptation of the Community direct~ve is rcqui1.·d ~n 
this sense. In addition it needs to be adapted i~ the sense of p&r~s 39 
to 42 above. A directive to this effect is annexed to ~:-·e . .:cc.;r:c. ~:. :..::n 
for a Council decision at Annex A. 
I. 
Ef£2m~goQd1i~J_fgr_s_£QYD£il_Q~£i~igo_~go~~toiog_tb~-D~9Q1i~­
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authorising the Commission to take part in the negotiation 
of a new International Sugar Agreement 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 
and in particular Article 113 thereof; 
Having regard to the recommendation of the Commission; 
Whereas the Community has declared that it supports the principle of 
setting up a new International Sugar Agreement and of participating 
in it; 
Whereas an International Conference will be held in Geneva from 
18 ~pril to 27 May 1977 within the framework of UNCTAD for the nego-
tiation of a new International Sugar Agreement; 
Whereas the Community should take part in these negotiations, which 
involve the common commercial policy; 
HAS DECIDED AS FOLLOWS 
The CoMmission is hereby authorised to participate in the negotiation 
of a new International Sugar Agreement. 
.1. 
• 
... 
--· ··---------
• 
• .. The Commission shall conduct the negotiations within the framework 
of the annexed directive and in consultation with the Special 
. 
Committee provided for in Article 113 of the Treaty. 
Done at Bruss~ 1 s, 
For the Council 
The President 
- " -· ~ r- -· ----
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Annex to Council Decision of ••• 
--------------------------------
~~gg!is!iog_p~cti~~ 
:f2.t 
!D!~.tDs!lQDs!-~Y9s!-~9.t~~ID~D! 
1. Following the relevant Council decision of June 1976, the Community 
has taken part in the preparatory work towards a new International 
Sugar Agreement, conducted in the framework of the existing Agreement. 
2. The Community's proposals in this context have been directed towards the 
negotiation of an agreement to coordinate national stockpiling policies 
on the lines laid down in Section II of the directives for the GATT 
multilateral trade negotiations (Council document 1/40/1/75 (CoS 4) rev. 1 
of 24 April 1975). Those directives exclude tne .Possibility of accepting 
export quotas. 
3. The consensus reached by all the other participants in the preparatory 
work is that the new Agreement should follow the general lines of the 
International Sugar Agreement 1968 : that is, it should be based on export 
quotas, supported by certain other disciplines at the level of predetermined 
maximum and minimum prices. A conference to negotiate such an agreement has 
been convened by UNCTAD for the period 18 April to 27 May 1977. 
4. In order to enable the Community to participate in these negotiations 
in a positive spirit but without compromising the essential characteristics 
• 
of its own internal market organisation, the Council authorises the Commission 
to negotiate at t-he -·~~iC-TAD-Conferenc_e_ on-the basis that the Com-munity is pre: 
.pared to participat_e in an agreement of the type described in para 3 above- pro~ 
vided it is accorded spe~ial status. Under the terms of that special status 
the Community would undertake :.tacking obligations which would paral-
lel the export quota adjustment obligations undertaken by the other members 
of the agreement; but it would not itself accept any quota obligations. 
5. This directive does not define in advance the precise line of action for 
the Community to follow in the detailed aspects of the negotiations. For 
obvious tactical reasons it would be inadvisable for the Community to reveal 
its proposals in detail until the negotiations have reached tre point where 
these would have the maximum effect. The directive must, however, be sutfi-
ciently clear to enable the Community to embark on the negotiations with 
.1. 
• 
.: 
2 • 
a clear idea of its objectives. 
6. This directive will have to be defined more precisely as the negotia-
tions develop. 
7. The agreement should constitute a framework for multilateral coopera-
tion to ensure the expansion of trade on a stable world market. 
The purpose of the agreement would be to 
- achieve price stabilisation, 
-ensure the continuity of supplies to importers and of outlets 
for exporters, 
- take due account of the interests of developing countries. 
8. In order to be completely effective the agreement should involve the 
major producing and consuming countries. If the agreement is concluded 
before the conclusion of the GATT multilateral negotiations the net 
balance of advantages and obligations arising out of it shall be taken 
into account in the final balance to be struck in connection with ~h~ 
GATT negotiations. 
9. Market stabilisation should be sought through the introduction of a 
minimum and maximum safeguard price provision including obligations 
linked to extreme price situations. 
, 
10. A minimum and a maximum price would be fixed in the Agreement defining 
a price bracket within which operations would normally take place. 
These prices, which would be fixed for a given period, would be subject 
to review in the light of long term market trends. 
11. If market prices fell to the fixed minimum of the bracket, the importing 
countries would be obliged to obtain their supplies from exporting 
.I. 
-
3. 
' \ 
member countries, which in turn would be obliged to respect this mini-
mum price and refrain from selling on more favourable terms to non-
member countries. ...\ 
12. If market prices reached or exceeded the level of the maximum price of 
the bracket, exporting countries would undertake to give priority to 
supplying importing countries which were party to the Agreement with 
the quantities traditionally imported by them at the maximum price 
level. 
13. The Community would accept no export quota obligations. It would, ho-
wever, be prepared to negotiate a commitment to contribute to the sta-
bilisation of the world sugar market, through mechanisms compatible 
with its own market organisation, parallel to the commitments accepted 
by other exporters. The mechanisms envisaged for this purpose would be 
broadly of the type described (mutatis mutandis> in paragraphs 13 to 
15 of the GATT negotiating directive referred to in paragraph 2 above, 
and of which the text is reproduced in footnote (1) below for reference. 
14. For the purpose of calculating the number of votes to which the Community 
would be entitled in the college of exporters under the administrative 
provisions of the Agreement, al1 its exports would be taken into account, 
including those exports corresponding to the quantity of imports into 
the Community under Protocol n° 3 of the Lome Convention and parallel 
special arrangements. 
15. A specific provision to enable the Community as such to become a party 
to the agreement would also be required. 
16. The functioning of the mechanisms described above implies that a body 
responsible for the continuous surveillance of the market situation 
should be set up under the A~reement to work, where necessary, with 
international organisations. 
"13. In order to achieve greater market stability, national stocks should 
be ~et up and managed on the basis of rules laid down in the Agreement. 
These rules should therefore define the minimum and maximum amounts which 
the body could stockpile in order to meet the objectives of the Agreement. 
They should also determine the allocation of these stocks. 
.1. 
(1) 14. If market prices reached a percentage laid down in the Agreement 
of the minimum price of the bracket the member countries would 
undertake with due regard for other market factors to stockpile 
fixed quantities of [sug~rJ within the agreed maximurP amount in 
a co-ordinated manner. 
15. If market prices reached a percentage laid down in t~~ Agreement 
of the maximum price of the bracket, the member countries would 
arrange for appropriate quantities to be taken from their stocks 
and placed on the market in a co-ordinated manner." 
4. 
1 The rresent proposal, which relates only to the negotiating 
stance to be adopted by the Community, has in itself no new 
fi~ancial implications~ 
2. These w~uld only arise from a future Council decision as to 
whether or not to partlcipate in a new International Sugar 
Agreement~ after its terms had been negotiated. 
3. The financial implications of such a future decision woulo be 
related to 
(a) a judgment as to whether the overall cost of the Comm~rity's 
sugar policy would be less costly inside or outside the Agree-
ment; and 
(b) the obligation to make an annual contribution to the aar:·-l~tr~­
tive b~dget of the International Sugar Organizatiun, 1! tne 
Community decided to join. On the basis of the current scale of 
contributions, thi~ could reasonably be estimated at not ~;Jre 
than~ 44 000 per year. 
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